"international law". The Free Dictionary. The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Retrieved 13 September 2011. The term was coined by Jeremy Bentham in "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation" in 1780. See Bentham, Jeremy (1789), An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, London: T. Payne, p. 6, retrieved 2012-12-05

The [Merriam Webster Inc. 2013 definition of 'international law'](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/international law International Law) suggests that the term refers princiaply to agreements "regarded and accepted as binding in relations between states".FN1 If adopting this definition, however, one must carefully differentiate between binding forms of 'law' another other aspects of 'jurisprudence'.


FN1: Merriam-Webster.com. Springfield: Merriam-Webster, Inc. Available online at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/international law [Accessed: 22 October 2013].

The full definition given by Merriam-Webster is as follows:

"A body of rules, norms, and standards generally regarded and accepted as binding in relations between states / nations in their relations with each other.

International law differs from state-based legal systems in that it is primarily applicable to countries rather than to private citizens, and that it is primarily a means of consent-based governance."


Branches of International Law

The two traditional branches of the field of international law are:

  1. jus gentium — law of nations
  2. jus inter gentes — agreements among nations

The two traditional Western (Roman-derived) branches of International Law are:

International law comprises distinct legal disciplines, namely:

International Law as a Theoretical Construct

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Much of international law is consent-based governance. This means that a state member of the international community is not obliged to abide by this type of international law, unless it has expressly consented to a particular course of conduct.[4] This is an issue of state sovereignty. However, other aspects of international law are not consent-based but still are obligatory upon state and non-state actors such as customary international law and peremptory norms (*jus cogens*).

...

International Law defines the legal responsibilities of states in their conduct with one another, as well as their responsibilities with regard to thw treatment of individuals under their juristiction. It also regulates the global commons, such as the environment, sustainable development, international waters, outer space, global communications and world trade. As sucuh, the domain of international law encompasses a wide range of issues, including human rights, disarmament, international crime, refugees, migration, problems of nationality, the treatment of prisoners, the use of force, and the conduct of war, among others.

It is important to recognize the theoretical contradictions inherent in the concept of international law. The concept of "law" can be generally understood as "a rule of conduct or action prescribed or formally recognized as binding or enforced by a controlling authority"[http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/law Merriam-Webster Dictionary: law] State parties to international law, however, are sovereign entities, with "sovereign" being defined as posessing "supreme power or authority." Given this contradiction, nations have at times abrogated "International Laws" when they considered doing so in their national interest. Wikipedia. 2013 "[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law International Law]." Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. San Francisco: Wikimedia Foundation, Inc. Available online at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law [Accessed 02 November 2013]


The is a concept of [[World Law]], which signifies the evolution international law, taking 'the global good' as it sovereign. Initial steps in this direction include certain systems of supra-national law, but a true realization of a system akin to "World Law" may depend on the [[concomitant]] evolution of human awareness of people as inter-connected planetary citizens.


International law differs from state-defined legal systems in that it is primarily applicable to governments and [[non-state]] (or [[supra-state]]) [[agent |agents]] as opposed to private citizens. International law is also primarily a means of [[Consent-Based Governance |consent-based governance]].

National law may become international law when treaties delegate national jurisdiction to supranational tribunals such as the European Court of Human Rights or the International Criminal Court. Treaties such as the Geneva Conventions may require national law to conform.

== Sources of International Law ==

Sources of International Law are the materials and processes out of which the rules and principles regulating the international community developed. They have been influenced by a range of political and legal theories. During the 20th century, it was recognized by legal positivists that a sovereign state could limit its authority to act by consenting to an agreement according to the principle ''pacta sunt servanda''. This consensual view of international law was reflected in the 1920 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and preserved in Article 38(1) of the [http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice].

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice then went on to define the sources of international law.

Article 38(1) is generally recognised as a definitive statement of the sources of international law. It requires the Court to apply, among other things, (a) international conventions "expressly recognized by the contesting states", and (b) "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law". To avoid the possibility of ''non liquet'', sub-paragraph (c) added the requirement that the general principles applied by the Court were those that had been "the general principles of the law recognized by civilized nations". As it is states that by consent determine the content of international law, sub-paragraph (d) acknowledges that the Court is entitled to refer to "judicial decisions" and the most highly qualified juristic writings "as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law".

On the question of preference between sources of international law, rules established by treaty will take preference if such an instrument exists. It is also argued however that international treaties and international custom are sources of international law of equal validity; this is that new custom may supersede older treaties and new treaties may override older custom. Certainly, judicial decisions and juristic writings are regarded as auxiliary sources of international, whereas it is unclear whether the general principles of law recognized by 'civilized nations' should be recognized as a principal or auxiliary source of international law.

It may be argued that the practice of international organizations, most notably that of the United Nations, as it appears in the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, are an additional source of international law, even though it is not mentioned as such in Article 38(1) of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 38(1) is closely based on the corresponding provision of the 1920 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, thus predating the role that international organizations have come to play in the international plane. That is, the provision of Article 38(1) may be regarded as dated, and this can most vividly be seen in the mention made to 'civilized nations', a mentioning that appears all the more quaint after the decolonization process that took place in the early 1960s and the participation of nearly all nations of the world in the United Nations.

It is also possible, though less common, for a treaty to be modified by practices arising between the parties to that treaty. The other situation in which a rule would take precedence over a treaty provision would be where the rule has the special status of being part of the ''jus cogens''.

...

The development of International Law is one of the primary goals of the United Nations. The Charter of the United Nations, in its Preamble, sets the objective "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained".http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/internationallaw/

...

The General Assembly is the main deliberative body of the United Nations. Many multilateral treaties are adopted by it and subsequently opened for signature and ratification by member States of the United Nations.http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/internationallaw/

The General Assembly has adopted a number of multilateral treaties throughout its history, including:

  • Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)
  • International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)
  • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
  • International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
  • Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)
  • United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)
  • Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
  • Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996)
  • International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)
  • Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006)

The Legal (Sixth) Committee is the primary forum for the consideration of legal questions in the General Assembly. Many international instruments, including a number of international treaties have been adopted by the General Assembly on the basis of the recommendation of the Committee.

The International Law Commission was established by the General Assembly in 1948 with a mandate to undertake the progressive development and codification of international law under article 13(1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations. As an expert legal body, its task is to prepare draft conventions on subjects, which have not yet been regulated by international law and to codify rules of international law in fields, where there already has been extensive State practice. The Commission’s work in criminal law led to the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. It also drafted the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), among others.

Treaties and other international legal instruments are also developed by the specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), by the subsidiary organs of the United Nations, such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and by multilateral negotiating bodies, such as the Conference on Disarmament.

To become party to a treaty, a State must express, through a concrete act, its willingness to undertake the legal rights and obligations contained in the treaty – it must “consent to be bound” by the treaty. This is usually accomplished through signature and ratification of the treaty, or if it’s already in force, by accession to it.

Each year, the UN holds a Treaty Event, highlighting a group of treaties, as a way to encourage Member States to sign, ratify or otherwise support these treaties.

Different treaties may create different treaty body regimes to encourage the parties to abide by their obligations and undertake actions required for compliance.

Legal disputes between states can be referred to the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, which also gives advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized international organs and agencies.

...

The international human rights movement was strengthened when the United Nations General Assembly adopted of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) on 10 December 1948. Drafted as ‘a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations', the Declaration for the first time in human history spell out basic civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights that all human beings should enjoy. It has over time been widely accepted as the fundamental norms of human rights that everyone should respect and protect. The UDHR, together with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, form the so - called International Bill of Human Rights.http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx

A series of international human rights treaties and other instruments adopted since 1945 have conferred legal form on inherent human rights and developed the body of international human rights. Other instruments have been adopted at the regional level reflecting the particular human rights concerns of the region and providing for specific mechanisms of protection. Most States have also adopted constitutions and other laws which formally protect basic human rights. While international treaties and customary law form the backbone of international human rights law other instruments, such as declarations, guidelines and principles adopted at the international level contribute to its understanding, implementation and development. Respect for human rights requires the establishment of the rule of law at the national and international levels.http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx

International human rights law lays down obligations which States are bound to respect. By becoming parties to international treaties, States assume obligations and duties under international law to respect, to protect and to fulfil human rights. The obligation to respect means that States must refrain from interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation to protect requires States to protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses. The obligation to fulfil means that States must take positive action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights.http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx

Through ratification of international human rights treaties, Governments undertake to put into place domestic measures and legislation compatible with their treaty obligations and duties. Where domestic legal proceedings fail to address human rights abuses, mechanisms and procedures for individual complaints or communications are available at the regional and international levels to help ensure that international human rights standards are indeed respected, implemented, and enforced at the local level http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/internationallaw.aspx

Supranational law

Supranational law is a form of international law, based on the limitation of the rights of sovereign nations between one another. It is distinguished from public international law, because in supranational law, nations explicitly submit their right to make judicial decisions by treaty to a set of common tribunal. The United Nations Security Council and subordinate organizations such as the International Court of Justice are the only globally accepted supranational tribunals.

American supranational law

The Articles of Confederation, formally the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, was the first supranational agreement where 13 sovereign states were unified in a common government, which later became the United States of America. The central government proved too weak to manage the growing economy as the sovereign states incurred national debts and independently managed their national currencies without central coordination. The supranational government was terminated and the sovereign states were united into a unified nation by the United States Constitution in 1785. European Union supranational law[edit]

European Union law

European Union law was the next example of a supranational legal framework. In the EC, sovereign nations have pooled their authority through a system of courts and political institutions. They have the ability to enforce legal norms against and for member states and citizens, in a way that public international law does not. According to the European Court of Justice in the early case, 26/62, of NW Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Admniistratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, (often known as just Van Gend en Loos) it constitutes "a new legal order of international law":

"The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only member states but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of member states, community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the member states and upon the institutions of the community.""C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlanse Administratie Der Belastingen". Eur-Lex. Retrieved 2007-01-19.

The Treaty of Lisbon is an international agreement that amends the two treaties which comprise the constitutional basis of the European Union that entered into force on 1 December 2009. It solidified human rights for individuals in all but three members. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union interpreted by the European Court of Justice does not to apply fully to the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Czech Republic by the British Protocol.

Public international law

Main article: Public international law

Public international law (or international public law) concerns the treaty relationships between the nations and persons which are considered the subjects of international law. Norms of international law have their source in either:

  • custom, or customary international law (consistent state practice accompanied by opinio juris),
  • globally accepted standards of behaviour (peremptory norms known as jus cogens or ius cogens), or
  • codifications contained in conventional agreements, generally termed treaties.

Article 13 of the United Nations Charter obligates the UN General Assembly to initiate studies and make recommendations which encourage the progressive development of international law and its codification. Evidence of consensus or state practice can sometimes be derived from intergovernmental resolutions or academic and expert legal opinions (sometimes collectively termed soft law).

Private international law

Main article: Conflict of laws

Conflict of laws, often called "private international law" in civil law jurisdictions, is less international than public international law. It is distinguished from public international law because it governs conflicts between private persons, rather than states (or other international bodies with standing). It concerns the questions of which jurisdiction should be permitted to hear a legal dispute between private parties, and which jurisdiction's law should be applied, therefore raising issues of international law. Today corporations are increasingly capable of shifting capital and labor supply chains across borders, as well as trading with overseas corporations. This increases the number of disputes of an inter-state nature outside a unified legal framework, and raises issues of the enforceability of standard practices. Increasing numbers of businesses use commercial arbitration under the New York Convention 1958.

International Law in Practice

International law can be established by custom or treaty.http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/international_law Slomanson, William (2011). Fundamental Perspectives on International Law. Boston, USA: Wadsworth. pp. 4–5. Treaties are the strongest and most binding type because they represent consensual agreements between the countries who sign them. Yet as stated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ):[http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 Statute of the International Court of Justice] CHAPTER II - COMPETENCE OF THE COURT, Article 38 More than [http://treaties.un.org/ 500 multilateral treaties] have been deposited] with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
  1. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
  2. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
  3. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
  4. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.

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The international community has long aspired to create a permanent international court to try the most serious international crimes, and, in the 20th century, it reached consensus on definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials addressed war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity committed during the Second World War.

In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) were established to fight impunity by trying crimes committed within a specific time-frame and during a specific conflict. In 2010, the UN Security Council created the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) to carry out a number of essential functions of the two ad hoc tribunals after the completion of their respective mandates. The Arusha, Tanzania branch of MICT started functioning in July 2012, while the branch located in The Hague, Netherlands will take over from the ICTY in July 2013.

In 1998, the international community reached an historic milestone when 120 States adopted the Rome Statute, the legal basis for establishing the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC).

The ICC is an independent international organization, and is not part of the United Nations system. Its seat is at The Hague in the Netherlands.

17 cases in 7 situations have been brought before the International Criminal Court. Cases are referred to the Court by states parties, by the UN Security Council or on the initiative of the Court’s Prosecutor. To date, there have been three state referrals from the governments of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and the Central African Republic, and two referrals from the United Nations Security Council regarding the situation in Darfur and the situation in Libya.

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International custom

Article 38.1(b) of the ICJ Statute refers to "international custom" as a source of international law, specifically emphasizing the two requirements of state practice plus acceptance of the practice as obligatory or ''opinio juris sive necessitatis'' (usually abbreviated as ''opinio juris'').

Derived from the consistent practice of (originally) Western states accompanied by ''opinio juris'' (the conviction of States that the consistent practice is required by a legal obligation), customary international law is differentiated from acts of comity by the presence of ''opinio juris'' (although in some instances, acts of comity have developed into customary international law, i.e. diplomatic immunity). Coupled with general principles of law and treaties, custom is considered by the International Court of Justice, jurists, the United Nations, and its member states to be among the primary sources of international law. For example, laws of war were long a matter of customary law before they were codified in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, Geneva Conventions, and other treaties.

The vast majority of the world's governments accept in principle the existence of customary international law, although there are many differing opinions as to what rules are contained in it.

The Statute of the International Court of Justice acknowledges the existence of customary international law in Article 38(1)(b), incorporated into the United Nations Charter by Article 92: "The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply...international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." Customary international law "... consists of rules of law derived from the consistent conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that way."Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law, p. 55. It follows that customary international law can be discerned by a "widespread repetition by States of similar international acts over time (State practice); Acts must occur out of sense of obligation (opinio juris); Acts must be taken by a significant number of States and not be rejected by a significant number of States." A marker of customary international law is consensus among states exhibited both by widespread conduct and a discernible sense of obligation.

A peremptory norm (also called jus cogens, Latin for "compelling law") is a fundamental principle of international law which is accepted by the international community of states as a norm from which no derogation is ever permitted. Examples include various international crimes; a state which carries out or permits slavery, genocide, war of aggression, or crimes against humanity is always violating customary international law.

Other examples accepted or claimed as customary international law include the principle of non-refoulement, immunity of visiting foreign heads of state, and the right to humanitarian intervention.

Treaties have gradually displaced much customary international law. This development is similar to the replacement of customary or common law by codified law in municipal legal settings, but customary international law continues to play a significant role in international law.

State practice

When examining state practice to determine relevant rules of international law, it is necessary to take into account every activity of the organs and officials of states that relate to that purpose. There has been continuing debate over where a distinction should be drawn as to the weight that should be attributed to what states do, rather than what they say represents the law. In its most extreme form, this would involve rejecting what states say as practice and relegating it to the status of evidence of ''opinio juris''.D'Amato, A., ''The Concept of Custom in International Law'' (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, New York, 1971) at 88. A more moderate version would evaluate what a state says by reference to the occasion on which the statement was made.Thirlway, H., ''International Customary Law and its Codification'' (A. W. Sijthoff: Leiden, 1972) at 58. It is only relatively powerful countries with extensive international contacts and interests that have regular opportunities of contributing by deed to the practice of international law. The principal means of contribution to state practice for the majority of states will be at meetings of international organisations, particularly the UN General Assembly, by voting and otherwise expressing their view on matters under consideration. Moreover, there are circumstances in which what states say may be the only evidence of their view as to what conduct is required in a particular situation.See ''Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits)'' [1986] ICJ Reports 14.

The notion of practice establishing a customary rule implies that the practice is followed regularly, or that such state practice must be "common, consistent and concordant".''Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v Iceland) (Merits)'' [1974] ICJ Reports 3 at 50. Given the size of the international community, the practice does not have to encompass all states or be completely uniform. There has to be a sufficient degree of participation, especially on the part of states whose interests are likely be most affected,''North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands'') [1969] ICJ Reports 4 at 42. and an absence of substantial dissent.''Nicaragua'' case (Merits), note 4 at 98. There have been a number of occasions on which the ICJ has rejected claims that a customary rule existed because of a lack of consistency in the practice brought to its attention.''Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru)'' [1950] ICJ Rep 266 at 277; ''Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict'' [1996] ICJ Reports 226.

Within the context of a specific dispute, however, it is not necessary to establish the generality of practice. A rule may apply if a state has accepted the rule as applicable to it individually, or because the two states belong to a group of states between which the rule applies.''Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) (Merits)'' [1960] ICJ Reports 6 at 39; ''Asylum'' case, note 8 at 276.

A dissenting state is entitled to deny the opposability of a rule in question if it can demonstrate its persistent objection to that rule,''North Sea Continental Shelf'' cases, note 6 at 229, 232 per Judge Lachs. either as a member of a regional group''Asylum'' case, note 8 at 277-8. or by virtue of its membership of the international community.''Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) (Judgment)'' [1951] ICJ Reports 116, at 131. It is not easy for a single state to maintain its dissent. Also, rules of the ''jus cogens'' have a universal character and apply to all states, irrespective of their wishes.See ''North Sea Continental Shelf'' cases, note 6 at 229 per Judge Lachs.

Demand for rules that are responsive to increasingly rapid changes has led to the suggestion that there can be, in appropriate circumstances, such a concept as "instant custom". Even within traditional doctrine, the ICJ has recognised that passage of a short period of time is not necessarily a bar to the formation of a new rule.''North Sea Continental Shelf'' cases, note 6 at 43. Because of this, the question is sometimes raised as to whether the word "custom" is suitable to a process that could occur with great rapidity.

''Opinio juris''

A wealth of state practice does not usually carry with it a presumption that ''opinio juris'' exists. “Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”See ''North Sea Continental Shelf'' cases, note 6 at 44.

In cases where practice (of which evidence is given) comprises abstentions from acting, consistency of conduct might not establish the existence of a rule of customary international law. The fact that no nuclear weapons have been used since 1945, for example, does not render their use illegal on the basis of a customary obligation because the necessary ''opinio juris'' was lacking.''Legality of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (GA)'', note 8.

Although the ICJ has frequently referred to ''opinio juris'' as being an equal footing with state practice,''Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) (Judgment)'' [1985] ICJ Reports 13 at 29; ''Legality of Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (GA)'', note 8 at 16. the role of the psychological element in the creation of customary law is uncertain...

''Jus cogens''

A peremptory norm or ''jus cogens'' (Latin for "compelling law" or "strong law") is a principle of international law considered so fundamental that it overrides all other sources of international law, including even the Charter of the United Nations. The principle of ''jus cogens'' is enshrined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:

:For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.1155 UNTS 331.

Rules of ''jus cogens'' generally require or forbid the state to do particular acts or respect certain rights. However, some define criminal offences which the state must enforce against individuals. Generally included on lists of such norms are prohibitions of such crimes and internationally wrongful acts as waging aggressive war, war crimes, crimes against humanity, piracy, genocide, apartheid, slavery and torture.

The evidence supporting the emergence of a rule of ''jus cogens'' will be essentially similar to that required to establish the creation of a new rule of customary international law. Indeed, ''jus cogens'' could be thought of as a special principle of custom with a superadded ''opinio juris''. The European Court of Human Rights has stressed the international public policy aspect of the ''jus cogens''.

Treaties as law

Treaties can play the role of contracts between two or more parties, such as an extradition treaty or a defence pact. They can also be legislation to regulate a particular aspect of international relations, or form the constitutions of international organisations. Whether or not all treaties can be regarded as sources of law, they are sources of obligation for the parties to them. Article 38(1)(a), which uses the term "international conventions", concentrates upon treaties as a source of contractual obligation but also acknowledges the possibility of a state expressly accepting the obligations of a treaty to which it is not formally a party.

For a treaty-based rule to be a source of law, rather than simply a source of obligation, it must either be capable of affecting non-parties or have consequences for parties more extensive than those specifically imposed by the treaty itself.

Treaties as custom

Some treaties are the result of codifying existing customary law, such as laws governing the global commons, and ''jus ad bellum''. While the purpose is to establish a code of general application, its effectiveness depends upon the number of states that ratify or accede to the particular convention. Relatively few such instruments have a sufficient number of parties to be regarded as international law in their own right. The most obvious examples are the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims.

Most multi-lateral treaties fall short of achieving such a near universal degree of formal acceptance, and are dependent upon their provisions being regarded as representing customary international law and, by this indirect route, as binding upon non-parties. This outcome is possible in a number of ways:

  • When the treaty rule reproduces an existing rule of customary law, the rule will be clarified in terms of the treaty provision. A notable example is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, which was considered by the ICJ to be law even before it had been brought into force.''Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276'' (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Reports 16 at 47.

  • When a customary rule is in the process of development, its incorporation in a multilateral treaty may have the effect of consolidating or crystallising the law in the form of that rule. It is not always easy to identify when this occurs. Where the practice is less developed, the treaty provision may not be enough to crystallise the rule as part of customary international law.''North Sea Continental Shelf'' cases, note 6 at 38.

  • Even if the rule is new, the drafting of the treaty provision may be the impetus for its adoption in the practice of states, and it is the subsequent acceptance of the rule by states that renders it effective as part of customary law.''North Sea Continental Shelf'' cases, note 6 at 41. See also ''Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal'', Vol. 1, Judgment, 171 at 253-4. If a broad definition is adopted of state practice, the making of a treaty would fall within the definition. Alternatively, it is possible to regard the treaty as the final act of state practice required to establish the rule in question, or as the necessary articulation of the rule to give it the ''opinio juris'' of customary international law.

  • Convention-based "instant custom" has been identified by the ICJ on several occasions as representing customary law without explanation of whether the provision in question was supported by state practice. This has happened with respect to a number of provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. If "instant custom" is valid as law, it could deny to third parties the normal consequences of non-accession to the treaty.

General principles of law

The scope of general principles of law, to which Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ refers, is unclear and controversial but may include such legal principles that are common to a large number of systems of municipal law. Given the limits of treaties or custom as sources of international law, Article 38(1) may be looked upon as a directive to the Court to fill any gap in the law and prevent a ''non liquet'' by reference to the general principles.

In earlier stages of the development of international law, rules were frequently drawn from municipal law. In the 19th century, legal positivists rejected the idea that international law could come from any source that did not involve state will or consent, but were prepared to allow for the application of general principles of law, provided that they had in some way been accepted by states as part of the legal order. Thus Article 38(1)(c), for example, speaks of general principles "recognised" by states. An area that demonstrates the adoption of municipal approaches is the law applied to the relationship between international officials and their employing organisations,Amerasinghe, C., ''The Law of the International Civil Service'', 2nd rev. edn, vol. 1 (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994) at 151-8. although today the principles are regarded as established international law.

The significance of general principles has undoubtedly been lessened by the increased intensity of treaty and institutional relations between states. Nevertheless, the concepts of estoppel and equity have been employed in the adjudication of international disputes. For example, a state that has, by its conduct, encouraged another state to believe in the existence of a certain legal or factual situation, and to rely upon that belief, may be estopped from asserting a contrary situation in its dealings.See ''North Sea Continental Shelf'' cases, note 6 at 26; ''Flegenheimer Claim'' 25 ILR 91; ''Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand) (Merits)'' [1962] ICJ Reports 6 at 32-3. The principle of good faith was said by the ICJ to be "[o]ne of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations".''Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v France; New Zealand v France)'' [1974] ICJ Reports 253 at 268. Similarly, there have been frequent references to equity.''River Meuse Case (Netherlands v Belgium)'' PCIJ Reports Series A/B No 70 76 at 76 per Judge Hudson.} It is generally agreed that equity cannot be employed to subvert legal rules (that is, operate ''contra legem'').''Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali) (Judgment)'' [1986] ICJ Reports 554 at 567-8; ''North Sea Continental Shelf'' cases, note 6 at 46-50. This "equity as law" perception is reinforced by references to equitable principles in the text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, though this may be little more than an admission as to the existence, and legitimation, of the discretion of the adjudicator.

However, the principles of estoppel and equity in the international context do not retain all the connotations they do under common law. The reference to the principles as "general" signify that, if rules were to be adapted from municipal law, they should be at a sufficient level of generality to encompass similar rules existing in many municipal systems. Principles of municipal law should be regarded as sources of inspiration rather than as sources of rules of direct application.''International Status of South-West Africa (Advisory Opinion)'' [1950] ICJ Reports 128 at 148.

Judicial decisions and juristic writings

According to Article 38(1)(d) of its Statute, the ICJ is also to apply "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law". It is difficult to tell what influence these materials have on the development of the law. Pleadings in cases before the ICJ are often replete with references to case law and to legal literature.

Judicial decisions

The decisions of international and municipal courts and the publications of academics can be referred to, not as a source of law as such, but as a means of recognizing the law established in other sources. In practice the International Court of Justice does not refer to domestic decisions although it does invoke its previous case-law.

There is no rule of ''stare decisis'' in international law. The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.''Article 59 of the ICJ Statute'' [http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 Statute of the International Court of Justice]. Nevertheless, often the Court would refer to its past decisions and advisory opinions to support its explanation of a present case.

The International Court of Justice will often consider the draft Articles on international law published by the International Law Commission and the General Assembly resolutions as indicative of customary international law.

Juristic writings

Article 38(1)(d) of the ''International Court of Justice Statute'' states that the 'teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations' are also among the 'subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law'. The scholarly works of prominent jurists are not sources of international law but are essential in developing the rules that are sourced in treaties, custom and the general principles of law. This is accepted practice in the interpretation of international law and was utilised by the United States Supreme Court in ''The Paquete Habana'' case (175 US (1900) 677 at 700-1).

References

"international law". The Free Dictionary. The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Retrieved 13 September 2011. The term was coined by Jeremy Bentham in "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation" in 1780. See Bentham, Jeremy (1789), An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, London: T. Payne, p. 6, retrieved 2012-12-05

The [Merriam Webster Inc. 2013 definition of 'international law'](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/international law International Law) suggests that the term refers princiaply to agreements "regarded and accepted as binding in relations between states".FN1 If adopting this definition, however, one must carefully differentiate between binding forms of 'law' another other aspects of 'jurisprudence'.

FN1: Merriam-Webster.com. Springfield: Merriam-Webster, Inc. Available online at: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/international law [Accessed: 22 October 2013].


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